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All these people [Constitutional law professor Asher Maoz, Education Minister Gideon Sa'ar, and Professor Amnon Rubinstein] endanger freedom of expression and academic freedom. They blur the fundamental distinction between the right to freedom of expression and academic freedom on the one hand, and on the other, the question of whether it is appropriate to use those freedoms to say things which are wrong or mistaken. Freedom of expression and academic freedom mean that people have the freedom to say things that are mistaken.

http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/profs-against-free-speech-1.305414

Profs against free speech
Freedom of expression and academic freedom mean that people have the freedom to say things that are mistaken.

By Chaim Gans
2/8/2010

Constitutional law professor Asher Maoz recently argued in these pages that university lecturers who call the naval commandos who raided the Mavi Marmara cold-blooded murderers, or soldiers who evacuate settlers Nazis, claim to fall under the protection of academic freedom but actually have nothing to do with that.

Education Minister Gideon Sa'ar beat Maoz to it, though. Not long ago, he said "calling for an academic boycott, for boycott activities against the State of Israel, are not legitimate in my eyes." And Amnon Rubinstein, another professor of constitutional law and a former education minister, joined the Yisrael Beiteinu chorus with a draft of an academic article that was recently posted on the Social Sciences-IL online network, in which he suggests allowing university disciplinary tribunals to sanction lecturers, including dismissing them, for making certain kinds of comments that do not constitute criminal offenses.

All these people endanger freedom of expression and academic freedom. They blur the fundamental distinction between the right to freedom of expression and academic freedom on the one hand, and on the other, the question of whether it is appropriate to use those freedoms to say things which are wrong or mistaken. Freedom of expression and academic freedom mean that people have the freedom to say things that are mistaken.

Maoz does a good job of exploiting that freedom. When he firmly asserts that calling the naval commandos cold-blooded murderers and calling the evacuating soldiers Nazis has nothing to do with academic freedom, he is doubly mistaken. First of all, if a criminal law professor is saying such things, they are within the scope of his academic discipline. Of course, it is almost certain the professor is wrong. But just as constitutional law professors are allowed to make mistakes, so are criminal law professors.

Secondly, even if these statements were not within the scope of the professor's academic field, they should still be permitted for reasons of freedom of expression. Of course, academics shouldn't be allowed to spend significant chunks of their lectures on statements unrelated to the teaching material. But that doesn't mean the examples cited fall outside academics' freedom of expression. This is so in the same way that it doesn't follow that just because you shouldn't express political opinions outside your neighbor's window at 3 A.M., you don't have the freedom to express political opinions at all.

The examples Maoz gives are examples of harsh, ugly and offensive statements. But that doesn't mean they should no longer be protected by academic freedom. Similar things can be said about Sa'ar's comment. In saying that calling for a boycott is not legitimate, Sa'ar is not just saying that it is improper to call for such a boycott; he is implying that doing so should be prohibited.

And Rubinstein doesn't make do with implications. He is clearly trying to break the errant academics.

To protect freedom of expression, there need to be very high hurdles that have to be surmounted before speech can be banned because of its content or potential consequences. One of the classic reasons for not limiting speech for content-related reasons or possible consequences includes the great value of free speech for major public goods such as democracy, science and art.

Another reason is fact that speech does not generally cause immediate damage, and that it usually causes damage can often be offset by expressing the opposite opinion. A further reason stems from the chilling effect of banning speech on freedom of thought.

These reasons are all the more applicable to freedom of expression within the academic world. The kind of statements cited by current and former education ministers and professors of Israeli constitutional law can be the objects of protest and condemnation, but not the causes of punishment or the targets of bans.